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Abstract 
This paper develops a model for the monopolistic competition of subcenters for the shoppers 
and workers of a central city. The model is an extension of the de Palma & Proost (2004) model 
that is limited to the symmetric case. Inhabitants of a CBD can choose one of the subcenters to 
buy a differentiated product and choose one of the subcenters to supply differentiated labour. 
The subcenters compete in prices and wages and the access to the subcenters can be 
congested. The short term and free entry equilibria are studied. As general properties are rare 
in the non-symmetrical monopolistic competition case, this paper draws more on numerical 
examples than on hard theorems. Starting from a symmetric base case, the paper explores the 
effects on welfare and number of subcenters of introducing diversity in the distances to the 
subcenter, quality of the subcenters, congestion and attractiveness of the subcenter as 
workplace. The paper shows cases where asymmetry can increase welfare and where the order 
in which firms enter the market matters for the equilibrium outcome.     
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1. Introduction 
Congestion on a Friday night or Saturday morning on your way to the shopping mall is a well-
known problem. Surprisingly, it has not been on the research agenda for many economists. 
Fujita and Thisse (2002) looked into the economics of shopping malls. Shopping malls reduce 
search costs for the customers but also reduce the profitability of the firms located in the 
subcenter if they offer products that are easily substitutable. This explains the presence of very 
different shops in one shopping mall. We are interested in the competition between shopping 
malls and in the effects of congestion on their profitability and ultimately on the number of 
shopping malls. In fact we are interested in subcenters that may be shopping malls or sell any 
other product. Important is that the product they offer is diversified and that customers are all 
located in a center and can choose what subcenter to go to for their shopping. There will be 
different roads to each of the subcenters so that we can study the role of congestion on the 
competition between subcenters and on the number of subcenters.  
De Palma and Proost (2004) developed a monopolistic competition model for a city with 
subcenters where the city inhabitants can shop and work in the subcenters. They focussed on 
symmetric Nash equilibria and looked into the existence and properties of these equilibria. The 
real world is very often non symmetric and this paper studies non-symmetric equilibria. As 
general properties are rare in the non-symmetrical monopolistic competition case, this paper 
draws more on numerical examples than on hard theorems.      
Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 describes briefly the numerical solution algorithm as 
non-symmetrical monopolistic competition offers non trivial computation problems. Section 4 
presents one transparent numerical base case without congestion. This symmetric base case 
with 5 subcenters will be the starting point for exploring the effect of diversity in parameters as 
there are distances to the subcenter, quality of the subcenters and attractiveness of the 
subcenter as workplace. Section 5 discusses the welfare implications of the free entry 
equilibrium. We show in this section that asymmetry can sometimes increase welfare. We also 
show that the order in which firms enter the market matters for the equilibrium outcome. We 
leave the most difficult part, the role of congestion, to section 6. Congestion is introduced via the 
bottleneck model and we show how congestion interacts with quality differentials and how this 
affects welfare. Results appear much less generalisable. Section 7 concludes and offers some 
ideas for further research in this area. 
2. The Model 
2.1. Model setting 
De Palma and Proost (2004) have developed a model to study imperfect competition in a city 
both with and without congestion. Although they concentrate their analysis on the symmetric 
situation, the basic model set-up also applies in the more general asymmetric case. A brief 
description of the model setting is therefore presented here together with the relevant equations 
for household preferences and firms’ profits. More details can of course be found in the original 
paper. From this starting point, we derive the asymmetric equilibrium solution: the no-
congestion case being considered here, while the effects of congestion are discussed briefly. 
Residents live in a city centre and travel to sub-centres to work and shop. Shopping and 
working decisions are made independently, so that trip chaining is excluded, and residents can 
only travel between the centre and each subcentre and not between subcentres (Figure 2-1). A 
homogeneous good is produced in the city centre and used as an intermediate input for the 
differentiated good, which is produced in the sub-centres. Thus, both firms and consumers incur 
travel costs. In this general equilibrium setting, the numeraire homogeneous good represents all 
production in the economy other than the differentiated good and all profits are returned to the 
households. The labour market is also considered separately and jobs in the differentiated 
industry are heterogeneous. Only one differentiated product variant is produced at each sub-
centre by a single firm and each household will consume one unit of differentiated good and 
supply one unit of labour for its production. Hence, in the current formulation, demand for the 
differentiated good is inelastic and, if the labour market is assumed to be fully flexible, the 
product and labour markets will clear. All remaining labour and income is devoted to the 
homogeneous good and there is therefore no possibility of non-consumption or unemployment. 
Each sub-centre requires some road infrastructure, which is paid for by a levy on firms and 
head-tax on consumers. 
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Figure 2-1  schematic of city layout 
2.2. Household preferences 
As households make discrete choices, an indirect conditional utility function can be used to 
express their preferences. In this case the utility function represents the preferences of a 
household that buys differentiated good k and supplies labour to sub-centre i: 
 
1(1 )d wik k k k i i i l
l
U h p t w t T
N
α β α θ β π= − − + − − + − + −∑   (1) 
There are N households, each of which is paid a wage, iw , for working at sub-centre i and buys 
one unit of variant k at price, kp . Both these variables will be determined by the model. In the 
following we will use household and consumer interchangeably as it is easier to consider the 
household as a single worker or shopper. Thus, the consumer’s commuting and shopping travel 
costs, which are exogenous when there is no congestion, are given by w itα  and 
d
itα respectively. The remaining terms in (1) represent his utility from production of the 
homogeneous good, share of the profits and a head-tax, T. These are the same for all 
consumers. 
The utility of consumption of differentiated product variant k is given by an intrinsic quality 
component kh and a stochastic component 
d
kµ ε : 
 dk k kh h µ ε= +  (2) 
and the disutility of labour at sub-centre i is similarly given by the following two components: 
 wi i iβ β µ ε= −  (3) 
Hence, all households will value the quality of the product variant manufactured at a particular 
subcentre in the same way and will experience the same disinclination to work at a given 
subcentre; in both cases possibly assigning different values to different subcentres. However, 
the households will still vary in their tastes: the parameters iε and kε represent the intrinsic 
heterogeneity of consumer tastes and it is again assumed that they are double exponentially 
distributed. The parameters wµ and dµ determine the degree of heterogeneity of preferences. 
When a household chooses where to work, this is independent of its shopping decision and vice 
versa. Substituting from (2) and (3) in (1), we obtain |
w w
i k k i i i iU w tβ α µ ε= Ω + − − + , where 
1(1 ) d dk l k k k k
l
T h p t
N
θ β π α µ εΩ = − + − + − − +∑  is assumed fixed for the choice of 
employment location. The probability that a consumer chooses to commute to sub-centre i of 
the n possible sub-centres is then | |Pr { 1,..., }i
w
i k j kP ob U U j n= ≥ ∀ = , independent of k and 
can be written as a logit type probability 
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For the household choice of shopping location, we obtain |
d d
k i i k k k kU h p tα µ ε= Ω + − − + , 
where
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θ β π β α µ εΩ = − + − + − − +∑ is assumed constant for shopping 
decisions, and a similar expression for the probability is derived: 
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Using the assumptions of inelastic demand for the differentiated good and fixed labour input for 
the differentiated good, a market clearing condition also applies at each sub-centre: 
 w di iP P=  (6) 
2.3. Profits of firms 
There are n firms, each located at one of the subcentres. The profit of firm i is: 
 1( , ) ( ) ( )hi i i i i i iw p p w c t D F Sπ α= − − − − +  (7) 
where 1 h ic tα+ is the marginal cost of the intermediate input, iF is the fixed production cost and 
iS is the government levy to pay for public infrastructure. The inelastic demand condition gives 
us 
n
i
i
D N=∑ and from (7), we obtain demand w di i iD NP NP= = . 
 Each firm selects prices and wages to maximise his profits, given that his competitors do the 
same. Thus we look for a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium in these variables. 
2.4. Equilibrium 
The strategic variables of firm i are iw and ip . From the market clearing condition (6), 
substituting from (4) and(5), it is clear that the choice of iw  determines the choice of ip (and 
vice versa), since all other prices and wages are taken as given. Thus, we can rewrite the profit 
condition (7) as: 
 1( ) ( [ ] ) [ ] ( )h wi i i i i i i i i iw p w w c t NP w F Sπ α= − − − − +  (8) 
Taking iw as the only strategic variable, the best response of firm i is given by: 
 ( )1 11 0wh wi i ii i i iw
i i
d dp Pp w c t NP
dw dw
π α µ
    −= − + − − − =        
 (9) 
where 
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for both symmetric and asymmetric conditions, using (6). Substituting from (10) in (9) and 
rearranging leads to a candidate equilibrium 
 1
( ) ; 1,...,
(1 )
w d
e e h
i i i w
i
p w c t i n
P
µ µα += + + + ∀ =−  (11) 
Clearly (11) is not soluble analytically for the general asymmetric case in which wiP is given by 
(4). A numerical approach is required. The uniqueness of (11) is discussed in de Palma and 
Proost (2004).  
In addition to effects on price, profit and market share, we are interested in the welfare 
implications of the asymmetric model.  For the symmetric case, welfare per household can be 
calculated from 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) log( )d wnW n F K n
N
µ µ= Ξ − + + +  (12) 
where 1(1 ) ( )h d wh c tβ θ β α α αΞ = − + − + − − + +  and marginal cost pricing is assumed. 
The asymmetric version is derived later in Section 5.1. 
3. Numerical Solution 
3.1. Solution method 
For the numerical solution we have to calculate both ip and iw . Thus we have 2n unknowns and 
only n equations from the price equilibrium (11). However, the market clearing conditions, (6), 
provide n further relations between ip and iw . Unfortunately, these do not allow us to fully 
specify the problem, as, for the logit model, the nth relation, w dn nP P= , can be determined from 
the other n-1 market clearing conditions; we then have 2n unknowns and 2n-1 equations. 
The uniqueness condition specifies that i ip w− is determined uniquely from (11) for all i. For 
the symmetric case, it’s clear that specifying w fixes p, although there are an infinite number of 
w, with corresponding p, which satisfy this condition. For the asymmetric case, it can also be 
shown that by adding some constant γ  to all ip and iw , (11) is still satisfied and the 
probabilities remain unchanged for all firms. Thus, fixing the wage (or one price) of one firm 
leaves wiP  and 
d
iP  unchanged but allows us to uniquely specify ip and iw for all i. Without loss 
of generality, we therefore fix the nth wage. To then determine ip and iw we use the Newton-
Raphson approach, solving (11) and (6) as one system. 
3.2. Limiting case 
Testing the asymmetric model for the product and labour markets is not straightforward as there 
is no analytical relation between the equilibrium and optimum situations and we have no 
suitable empirical data at hand. We can of course easily test the model in the symmetric limit.  
A further test is to consider the limit 0wµ → . This effectively eliminates the labour market from 
the current model and reduces it to a single product market model, equivalent to the one 
presented in Anderson and de Palma (2001)2. 
4. Numerical Examples 
4.1. Symmetric base-case parameters 
It is clear that the model requires a significant amount of input information. Although the goal of 
the project is to gather data on realistic working and commuting situations, here, we limit our 
ambitions to a simple, stylised, symmetric example, based on an economy of one day. It is then 
possible to consider the effect of increasing consumer taste heterogeneity and of introducing 
asymmetries in travel time, product quality and disutility of labour in this economy.  
We first assume that there are one million households in the city. Each household supplies eight 
hours of labour, of which one hour is spent on the differentiated good. The wage they earn for 
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producing the non-differentiated good is arbitrarily set to one. They also make one commuting 
trip and one shopping trip per day, giving a total transport time of half an hour. The disutility of 
differentiated labour, iβ , for households is 0.2, reflecting a relatively high inclination to work. 
(Households would choose not to work if 1iβ = ). The utility of consumption of the differentiated 
good, h, is 5. A sufficiently large value is chosen to ensure that consumers will buy the 
differentiated good. Further, truck deliveries are such that each truck contains sufficient 
intermediate good to produce 50 units of the differentiated good. One unit of the differentiated 
good requires an intermediate input that can be produced using 0.1 units of homogeneous 
labour. Finally, the total fixed costs faced by each firm represent some 45% of the total labour 
costs for the differentiated goods and that this fixed cost consists of 50% of public infrastructure 
and 50% of private infrastructure. In this simple case there is no head-tax. The model inputs for 
the symmetric case are summarised in Table 4-1. 
 
Table 4-1 Input parameters for symmetric base case 
Parameter Definition Value Units 
*θ  Total labour time devoted to production of homogeneous good + transport 7.5  
hours of labour per 
household 
αω No of commuting trips per unit of labour 1 Commuting trips per household 
βi Disutility of labour in sub centre i 0.2 disutility 
hk Utility of consumption per unit of differentiated good k 5 utility 
αd No of shopping trips per unit of consumption 1 Shopping trips per household 
αh No of freight trips per unit of production 0.02  
c1 Intermediate input for differentiated good 0.1 
homogeneous good 
per unit of 
differentiated good 
µω Scale parameter for employment heterogeneity 0.2 - 
µd Scale parameter for consumption heterogeneity 0.2 - 
ti Travel time to subcentre i 0.25 hours per trip 
n No of firms 5  
N No of households 1,000,000  
*F Fixed set-up cost for production of differentiated good at subcentre 75,000 
Units of homogeneous 
good 
*K Fixed cost of road infrastructure for each subcentre 75,000 Units of homogeneous good 
*T Head tax per household 0  
*S Fixed levy per firm 75,000 Units of homogeneous good 
*not required for equilibrium calculation but for profit, welfare, etc 
Assuming there are five firms in the market, we can calculate the short-term price and wage 
equilibrium, for an arbitrary wage of 1.0. These data are presented in Table 4-2. Profits are 
negative due to the fixed costs and we therefore consider gross profits only in the analysis 
throughout this section. As explained in Section 3.1, fixing the wage of one firm is necessary in 
order to calculate the price and wage equilibrium numerically. For the symmetric case, this 
means fixing the wage of all firms. 
Deleted: Proportion of
Deleted: 9
Deleted: %?
Table 4-2  Symmetric base-case short-term equilibrium 
Price Wage Profit Gross profit Market share (%) Welfare 
1.61 1.0 -0.05 0.10 20 10.089 
 
This number of firms will clearly not be sustainable in the long-term because of the fixed costs 
and in fact only 3 firms are found in the free-entry equilibrium, while 2 firms are socially optimal. 
These numbers can be obtained from a symmetric version of the zero profit condition and by 
maximising the welfare equation (12) respectively3. Indeed it is shown that at most one more 
firm can be present in the free-entry equilibrium compared with the social optimum. 
In this study we wish to investigate the effect on the short-term equilibrium of varying 
parameters from the symmetric base-case values. Firstly, we simply increase the degree of 
consumer taste heterogeneity via parameters wµ and dµ , keeping everything else unchanged. 
The results, shown in Table 4-3 for wµ , are in fact identical for the two parameters as they have 
identical, independent distributions.  
Table 4-3 Results for short-term equilibrium of increasing µw  
µw Price Wage
Gross 
profit 
Welfare
0.2 1,61 1,00 0,10 10.09 
0.4 1,86 1,00 0,15 10.41 
0.8 2,36 1,00 0,25 11.05 
1.5 3,23 1,00 0,43 12.18 
3 5,11 1,00 0,80 14.60 
5 7,61 1,00 1,30 17.81 
 
The solution remains symmetric, market share does not change and profits are affected by 
changes in prices, which increase with wµ and dµ . As the consumer tastes become more 
polarised, they have less substitution possibilities for consumption (or labour) choices. Each firm 
then has less need to compete with the other firms in the market and can charge a higher price 
for its product variant. Welfare is also increasing because consumers obtain greater utility from 
their product variant of choice. 
4.2. Non-symmetric case – variation in a single parameter 
In this section we consider the impact on the short-term equilibrium of varying the product 
quality, disutility of labour, and journey time between firms: parameters ih , iβ  and it  
respectively. While we initially look at the effect of varying these parameters independently, in a 
realistic setting it is likely that there will be asymmetries in all of them. A ‘ranking’ parameter 
( )h d wi i ih tβ α α α− − + + is therefore introduced, which roughly represents the benefits 
accruing to households that choose to shop or work at subcentre i. We can then investigate the 
relationship between the ranking parameter (denoted rank) and (gross) profit and market share 
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for different combinations of ih , iβ  and it . All other parameters from Table 4-1 are held 
constant in each case. 
Although, the comparative statics exercise can be performed in a number of ways, we have 
chosen to present results for scenarios in which all the firms exhibit some asymmetry, except 
firm 3, which is the control and always takes the symmetric case value. This approach can be 
used to look at the effect of simple increases or decreases in a parameter from the symmetric 
case but also provides additional interesting information on the effect of the distribution of the 
asymmetries. 
Table 4-4 to Table 4-6 show the effect on the short-term equilibrium variables of varying ih , iβ  
and it individually, by up to 20%±  of the symmetric base-case values. For example, in Table 
4-4, the product quality of firm 1 ( 1h ) is 20% less than that of firm 3 ( 3h ), the product quality of 
firm 2 ( 2h ) is 10% less than 3h , the product quality of firm 4 is 10% more than 3h  and the 
product quality of firm 5 is 20% more than 3h . Thus the asymmetries are distributed 
symmetrically around the base-case value. The entries for parameters iβ  and it  in Table 4-5 
and Table 4-6 are obtained in an identical manner.  
Table 4-4 Results for short-term equilibrium with asymmetry in h 
Firm h β t Price Wage Gross 
profit 
Market 
share 
Rank 
1 4,0 0,2 0,25 0,73 0,22 0,004 1,09 3,20 
2 4,5 0,2 0,25 0,99 0,47 0,02 3,71 3,70 
3 5 0,2 0,25 1,26 0,70 0,05 11,78 4,20 
4 5,5 0,2 0,25 1,57 0,89 0,17 30,38 4,70 
5 6,0 0,2 0,25 1,96 1,00 0,45 53,03 5,20 
 
Table 4-5  Results for short-term equilibrium with asymmetry in β 
Firm h β t Price Wage Gross 
profit 
Market 
share 
Rank 
1 5 0,16 0,25 1,57 0,95 0,11 21,54 4,24 
2 5 0,18 0,25 1,57 0,96 0,10 20,75 4,22 
3 5 0,2 0,25 1,58 0,98 0,10 19,98 4,20 
4 5 0,22 0,25 1,59 0,99 0,10 19,23 4,18 
5 5 0,24 0,25 1,60 1,00 0,09 18,50 4,16 
 
Table 4-6 Results for short-term equilibrium with asymmetry in t 
Firm h β t Price Wage Gross 
profit 
Market 
share 
Rank 
1 5 0,2 0,2 1,61 0,98 0,13 23,94 4,30 
2 5 0,2 0,225 1,60 0,98 0,11 21,86 4,25 
3 5 0,2 0,25 1,59 0,99 0,10 19,88 4,20 
4 5 0,2 0,275 1,59 1,00 0,09 18,03 4,14 
5 5 0,2 0,3 1,58 1,00 0,08 16,29 4,09 
 
As discussed in Section 3.1, the wage of the fifth firm is fixed at the symmetric case value 
( 5 1w = ).We concentrate our analysis on the gross profit, since identical fixed costs are 
imposed for all firms. The fixed costs will of course affect the number of firms that can survive in 
the market in the long-term. This is discussed later. 
From Table 4-4 it can be seen that the firm with the highest quality product has the largest profit 
and the greatest market share. It also has the largest differential between price and wage. Thus, 
a firm can charge a higher price because its product is more desirable and, because of its larger 
market share, it has to pay a higher wage than its competitors in order to attract workers. On the 
other hand, Table 4-5 shows that when households are less inclined to work for a particular firm 
(high disutility of labour), the firm has lower profits and a lower market share. It must pay a 
higher wage than its competitors to attract workers. Finally, it can be seen from Table 4-6 that 
the firm located closest to the city centre (shortest travel time) enjoys the largest profit and 
market share. The firm can not only charge the highest price but can also pay its workers less, 
as the reduced commuting time makes it the most desirable work place and shopping centre.  
It should also be noted that a change in product quality has a more significant effect on the 
short-term equilibrium than comparable changes in disutility of labour and travel time. This is 
due to the larger change in absolute value of ih , which therefore has a larger impact on the 
rank. Further, for all input parameters, the equilibrium values for gross profit, price and market 
share are not symmetric about the base-case. This can be explained by the formulation of the 
logit probabilities ((4),(5)). For 3n ≥ firms, perturbations to the probability about the symmetric 
value weight positive changes more than negative ones, since the probability is determined by 
the double exponential distribution.  
As an illustrative example, gross profit and market share are also presented in Figure 4-1 as a 
function of rank for the data in Table 4-4 and additional scenarios, in which larger asymmetries 
are introduced. In each figure the 50%±  case is calculated in the same way as the 20%±  
scenario but with 50% or 25% increases or reductions in the parameter value over the 
symmetric base-case (firm 3) value. The +100% case corresponds to 50% and 100% increases 
over the base-case for firms 4 and 5, while firms 1 and 2 have the same values as in the 50%±  
case. Figure 4-1 clearly shows that, for a given scenario, both gross profit and market share are 
increasing functions of rank. The rank reflects a positive dependence on ih  as borne out by the 
tabular results.  
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Figure 4-1  Market share and profit versus rank for asymmetries in h 
4.3. Non-symmetric case – variations in multiple parameters 
It is also interesting to consider the effect of a combination of asymmetries in ih , iβ and it  on 
the short-term equilibrium. The results for this scenario are presented in Table 4-7 and the 
corresponding graphs of gross profit and market share are presented in Figure 4-2. Only a 
2%±  change in ih  was adopted as this parameter otherwise has a dominant effect on the 
equilibrium variables. It is clear that the most profitable firm still has the largest market share 
and that these variables increase with rank4. The effect of the interaction of iβ , ih and it on 
prices and wages is less apparent but clearly reflects the trade off between these parameters. 
 
Table 4-7 Results for short-term equilibrium with asymmetry in h, β and t 
Firm h β t Price Wage Gross 
profit 
Market 
share 
Rank 
1 5 0,18 0,2 1,72 1,08 0,13 24,65 4,32 
2 4,9 0,22 0,25 1,66 1,08 0,07 15,57 4,08 
3 5,2 0,24 0,275 1,85 1,21 0,13 24,16 4,30 
4 5,1 0,2 0,3 1,76 1,16 0,10 19,72 4,19 
5 4,8 0,16 0,225 1,58 1,00 0,08 15,91 4,09 
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Figure 4-2  Short-term equilibrium results for asymmetries in h, β and t 
We could also look at the effect of differences in fixed costs between firms. As noted earlier, 
these do not affect the short-term equilibrium calculation but change the magnitude of the profits 
by a non constant amount, which has consequences for the long-run equilibrium. For simplicity 
we do not consider asymmetries in the fixed costs further here. 
5. Welfare Analysis 
5.1. Theory 
The symmetric welfare function (12) is derived from [ ]max ikW E U=  since profits are equally 
distributed among households (Anderson et al 1992). We can also determine a corresponding 
expression for welfare in the asymmetric case from the same starting point. Using the definition 
of utility (1) and substituting the random variables from (2) and (3) we obtain 
 
1(1 )d d w wik k k k k i i i i l
l
U h p t w t T
N
α µ ε β α µ ε θ β π= − − + + − − − + − + −∑  (13) 
Then, because of the independence of the labour and consumption decisions in (13), we can 
write 
 max maxw w d di i i i i k k k k kW E w t E h p tβ α µ ε α µ ε   = Ψ + − − + + − − +     (14) 
where 
1(1 ) ( )j j
j
F K
N
θ βΨ = − − +∑  is constant. Since the iε  are double exponentially 
distributed with zero mean, the distribution of the maximisation term for utility of labour (2nd term 
in(14)), has the form 1( ) ( ( ))
n w
i i iiH x G x w tβ α== − − −∏ , where G is the double exponential 
distribution. Then, by definition 
 max ( )w wi i i i i iE E w t xh x dxβ α µ ε ∞−∞ = − − + =  ∫  (15) 
where h(x) is the density function corresponding to H. By means of Laplace transformation and 
the fact that the iε  distribution has zero mean, we obtain 
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( )
ln exp
w
j j jw
i w
j
w t
E
β αµ µ
  − −=       
∑  (16) 
A similar expression to (16) can be derived in an identical manner for the utility of consumption 
(3rd term in (14)) and combining these leads to the welfare formulation for the one day economy 
 
( )
ln exp ln exp
w d
j j j j j j jw d
w d
j j
w t h c w t
W
β α αµ µµ µ
      − − − − −= Ψ + +                  
∑ ∑ (17) 
where 1 hj jc c tα= +  and marginal cost pricing is assumed.  
We do not lose any generality by having iw present in the formula for W since we could replace 
iw  by iw γ+ , where γ  is the same constant for all i. Then because of the properties of the 
exponential and logarithm functions, the γ  terms cancel. Also marginal cost pricing ensures 
that the relationship between the ip  and iw  does not change as firms are added, since 
1 h
ic tα+  does not change. 
5.2. Short-term equilibrium 
It is interesting to compare the welfare in asymmetric short-term equilibria with the symmetric 
case. In general, an asymmetry in one parameter that leads to an overall increase (decrease) in 
utility also results in an increase (decrease) in welfare, as might be expected. The situation 
becomes more complicated when firms exhibit different combinations of asymmetries. This can 
be seen from the welfare calculations for each of the scenarios in Sections 4.2 and 4.3, which 
are presented in Table 5-1 below. 
 
Table 5-1 Welfare corresponding to short-term equilibria 
Asymmetry - h β t h, β, t 
Welfare 10.089 10.606 10.090 10.095 10.103 
 
Introducing asymmetries of 20%± , distributed evenly around the base-case value, in fact leads 
to an increase in welfare compared with the symmetric case, so the gains of households with 
increased utility more than offset the losses of those with decreased utility. This follows from the 
analysis of Section 4.2 regarding the formulation of the logit probabilities. Generalising to other 
scenarios, we find that this also holds true for the 50%±  case but, for example, when a large 
increase in disutility of labour for some firm is not compensated for by an equal reduction in 
disutility for another firm, welfare decreases.  
Although asymmetries in ih , iβ and it can increase welfare, as shown in Table 5-1, some 
combinations of asymmetries will also reduce welfare relative to the symmetric case. Hence, it 
is difficult to discern a general trend in this case. Our results are interesting, however, and may 
potentially be important for a policy maker, who then may wish to encourage (or allow) certain 
asymmetries in location, quality etc. for welfare gains. 
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5.3. Long-term equilibrium 
For the free-entry, long-term equilibrium, we require that the profit of the last firm to enter the 
market should not be less than zero. The results from the previous section indicate that the firm 
with the highest rank will always be the most profitable. Thus, we can find a long-term 
equilibrium, when market conditions are such that the highest ranked firms are able to enter the 
market first. We can then sort the firms by rank and, allowing firms to enter the market in 
decreasing rank order, calculate the short–term equilibrium profit obtained by each firm, until the 
profit of the mth firm entering the market is negative. This gives us m-1 firms in the free-entry 
equilibrium5. Clearly this system only works if the fixed costs are the same for all firms or, at 
least, the fixed costs result in profits which have the same rank order as the gross profits. We do 
not consider this aspect further here. Using the example presented in Table 4-7 (scenario w1 in 
Table 5-2 below) we find that there will be 3 firms in the long-run equilibrium. 
For the symmetric case, the socially optimal number of firms in the market can be derived from 
the welfare formulation, as this is an analytical function of the number of firms. For the 
asymmetric case, using (17), we can calculate the welfare generated as each new firm is added 
to the market in the long-run equilibrium calculation (again in rank order). If welfare decreases 
when the pth firm enters the market, then p-1 firms are socially optimal. For scenario w1, welfare 
decreases as each additional firm enters the market, suggesting that 2 firms, the minimum 
possible in the market, would be socially optimal.  
In the above example, the number of firms in the free-entry equilibrium and in the social 
optimum turns out to be the same as in the symmetric case (3 and 2 respectively). However, 
taking another set of firms with different parameters ( ih , iβ and it ) as, for example, scenario w2 
in Table 5-2, yields a different solution. In this case there are only 2 firms in both the long-run 
equilibrium and social optimum. Moreover, the firms themselves are different. For scenario w1, 
the rank indicates that firms 1, 3 and 4 would be present in the long-run equilibrium, whereas 
scenario 2 has firms 4 and 5 only. This is not to say that the ‘wrong’ firms will be present in the 
equilibrium but, rather, that different firms will be present in the long-run equilibrium depending 
on the range of values of ih , iβ and it for a given set of firms competing in the marketplace. In 
each case, the rank correctly identifies the most profitable firms.  
Table 5-2  Results for long-term equilibrium with asymmetry in h, β and t 
Scenario w1 Scenario w2 
firm h β t rank ∆profit 
of mth 
firm 
Welfare 
of m 
firms 
h β t rank ∆profit 
of mth 
firm 
Welfare 
of m 
firms 
1 5 0,18 0,2 4,32   4 0.24 0.2 3.26 <0 - 
2 4,9 0,22 0,25 4,08 <0 - 4.5 0.22 0.225 3.73 <0 - 
3 5,2 0,24 0,275 4,30 0.25 10.288 5 0.2 0.25 4.20 -0.09 10.844 
4 5,1 0,2 0,3 4,19 0.02 10.265 5.5 0.18 0.275 4.66 0.12 10.964 
5 4,8 0,16 0,225 4,09 -0.05 10.191 6 0.16 0.3 5.13   
 
                                                     
5 In each case, the last firm entering the market has its wage set equal to one. 
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The free-entry equilibrium described above for scenario w1 is not necessarily the only 
equilibrium for this set of parameter values. If we now consider that there are barriers to entry, 
we can construct examples that have different firms present in the long-term equilibrium and 
social optimum. Firstly, for scenario w3, we assume that for some reason firm 2 is already 
established in the market and then allow the remaining firms to enter in rank order. In scenario 
w4 we assume that firms 2 and 5 are already present and then allow the other firms to again 
enter according to rank. The results are shown in Table 5-3 below. 
Table 5-3  Examples of other possible long-run equilibria 
Scenario w3 Scenario w4 
Firm h β t Entry 
order 
(m) 
∆profit of 
mth firm 
Welfare of 
m firms 
Entry 
order 
(m) 
∆profit of 
mth firm 
Welfare of 
m firms 
1 5 0,18 0,2 2 0,34 10,198 3 0,13 10,1682 
2 4,9 0,22 0,25 1   1   
3 5,2 0,24 0,275 3 0,08 10,237 4 0,02 10,1675 
4 5,1 0,2 0,3 4 -0,03 10,189 5 -0,05 10,1026 
5 4,8 0,16 0,225 5 <0 - 2 0,25 10,0576 
 
In scenario w3, three firms (firms 1, 2 and 3) are able to exist in the long-term equilibrium and 
these are also socially optimal, since welfare only starts to decrease when firm 4 is added. In 
scenario w4, four firms are present in the long-term equilibrium but only three of these (firms 1, 
2 and 5) are socially desirable. Clearly over-entry is possible, even when the most profitable 
firms enter the market first. Identifying limits to over-entry and possible under-entry is not 
obvious from the welfare and zero profit equations, (17) and (8). Some further work is needed in 
this area. 
6. The Model With Congestion 
6.1. Model equations 
The main difference in the model, when congestion is taken into account, is that travel times 
become endogenous. Instead of being constant, travel times increase with the number of road 
users, where the road users are shoppers, commuters and trucks delivering the intermediate 
input. de Palma and Proost assume that roads have a fixed capacity and that a bottleneck 
develops if the activity on a road exceeds its capacity. They use the bottleneck model 
developed by Arnott et al (1993), where road users choose their trip timing (with no congestion 
pricing). Generalising this we can define the endogenous travel time for the asymmetric model 
as o wi i i
i
Nt t P
s
δ α= + where d w hα α α κα= + + 6andκ  ensures that one truck trip has the 
same congestion effect as 2 shopping or commuting trips. In the absence of congestion oit is 
the transport time from the centre to sub-centre i and is is the corresponding road capacity. The 
coefficient δ translates waiting time and schedule delays into equivalent costs. 
                                                     
6 The ; , ,x x d w hα = are defined in Section 4.1. 
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Setting s=750,000 car equivalents per hour for each subcentre, means an increase in travel 
time of approximately 8 minutes per 15 minute journey (i.e. a 50% increase), when there are 5 
firms. The δ value is taken from the literature (Arnott et al 1993) and means that queuing and 
schedule delay costs are of the order of 25% of the wage. 
6.2. Welfare analysis 
The welfare equation in the presence of congestion can be obtained from (17) by substituting 
the congested travel time. It is given by 
 
1
( )
ln exp
ln exp
w o w w
j j j jw
w
j
h o d o h d d d
d k k k k k k
d
k
w t P
W
h w c t t P P
β αµ µ
α αµ µ
  − − −Λ= Ψ +       
  − − − − −Λ −Λ+     
∑
∑
 (18) 
Table 6-1 contains the welfare for 20%±  asymmetries in iβ , ih and oit , as defined in 
Section 4.2, but now with fixed congestion, which is introduced via road capacity is .We 
also consider a similar perturbation in is . 
Table 6-1 Welfare results for short-term equilibria with congestion 
asymmetry - h β t s 
welfare 9.822 10.172 9.823 9.829 9.820 
 
Comparing Table 6-1 with Table 5-1 indicates that congestion reduces welfare. The presence of 
congestion affects welfare in three ways. There are time costs (schedule delay costs), since the 
traffic is not able to travel at the free-flow speed ( oit ) even if perfect congestion pricing can be 
imposed. In addition, if congestion is imperfectly priced, there are queuing costs. Congestion 
may also lead to over-entry in the longer term, since firms are able to make overly large profits. 
In the short-term this cost does not play a role as n is fixed. Table 6-1 and Table 5-1 are also 
consistent, in that 20%±  changes in iβ , ih and oit increase welfare with respect to the 
symmetric case. However, the asymmetries in is  reduce welfare. This is due to the inverse 
relation between is and congestion and the nature of the probability distribution, explained 
earlier. Performing the same exercise with 20%± changes in 1/ is results in a welfare increase. 
The asymmetries in road capacity generate only modest changes from the symmetric case 
because their effect on welfare is determined by the magnitude of w wi iPΛ relative to iβ  (or 
d d
k kPΛ  relative to kh )and, for the values used in our study, (0.1)w wi iP OΛ ≈ .  
We next consider welfare changes from the symmetric case result when both iβ and is  are 
varied. Welfare changes (dW) are presented in Figure 6-1 for a number of scenarios which are 
summarised in Table 6-2. In this case we see that their magnitude and sign depend on the 
relative magnitude of the asymmetries and whether they interact positively or negatively. In 
general, the effect of congestion dominates that of disutility of labour and welfare decreases, 
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although this is not necessarily the case when the asymmetries are randomly paired, as would 
probably occur in a realistic setting.  
Table 6-2 Summary of scenarios for asymmetries in both β and s 
 s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 
β 50%±  50%±  50%±  50%±  reverse 50%±  random order 
s 20%±  50%±  +100% +100% 20%±  
 
-0.060
-0.050
-0.040
-0.030
-0.020
-0.010
0.000
0.010
0.020
0.030
0.040
dW
s1 s2 s3 s4 s5
 
Figure 6-1  Differences in welfare from symmetric case for asymmetries in βand s 
A similar analysis with ih and is varying, indicates that, for the same magnitude of asymmetry, 
product quality effects dominate congestion effects and act to increase welfare but again, this 
does not generalise to the case, when pairings of asymmetries are randomised. It appears that 
the welfare effects of a particular set of asymmetric firms in the market will depend on the nature 
of the asymmetries. From the point of view of the policy planner, he may wish to encourage 
certain combinations of asymmetries in subcentre location, road capacity, product quality and 
amenities to attract workers, in order to increase social welfare. 
7. Conclusions 
In this study a model was developed to numerically calculate the short-term Nash equilibrium 
when there is product differentiation in an asymmetric oligopolistic market. The model was 
applied to the problem of shoppers and workers living in a city centre and commuting to 
subcentres. Asymmetries could occur in both product and labour markets via the parameters 
product quality, disutility of labour and travel times. Travel times were first assumed to be 
exogenous. It was then found that introducing asymmetries in the different parameters resulted 
in price equilibria that followed our economic intuition; a firm with higher product quality had 
larger profits and market share, for example. When combinations of asymmetries in product 
quality, disutility of labour and travel times were tested, a trade off between the parameters was 
seen. In all cases, the firm with the highest rank was the most profitable; rank being a rough 
measure of the benefits accruing to society from a firm. This ranking enabled us to calculate the 
number of firms in the long-term equilibrium and the socially optimal number of firms, assuming 
the highest ranked firm entered the market first. In contrast to the purely symmetric model, 
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these numbers depend on the nature of the asymmetries of the different firms and, moreover, 
the long-term equilibrium is not unique. For comparison, for a given set of firms, we constructed 
scenarios in which there were barriers to entry, which lead to different total numbers and 
different combinations of firms being present in the long-run. 
Congestion was also considered in the above approach using a bottleneck model, so that road 
capacity was limited and travel times endogenous. In the short-term welfare was reduced 
because of schedule delay costs and queuing costs. Asymmetries in product quality and 
disutility of labour followed the same pattern as for the no-congestion model, whereas travel 
times were dominated by changes in road capacity, which is inversely related to congestion  
The model already provides a useful tool for the policy maker, as it allows him to assess the 
benefits to society of allowing firms to locate at various distances from the subcentre, sell 
products of different quality or provide amenities to attract workers. It would clearly be 
interesting and useful, however, to extend the model in a number of ways.  
Firstly, we have only considered a rather stylised economy in this paper and, having established 
the main concepts, it would be sensible to look at a more realistic example. A more realistic 
economy could be constructed but obtaining empirical data for the city-subcentre set-up could 
be more problematic.  
It would also be interesting to consider the effect of specific policy measures, such as 
congestion pricing. In their paper, De Palma and Proost calculate the short-term symmetric 
price equilibrium with congestion charging. With perfect road pricing, the total travel time cost, 
which depends on road capacity only and not on other potentially asymmetric parameters, is 
reduced by half. It should therefore be possible to generalise this approach to the asymmetric 
case, since road users do not have a choice of routes to their destination of choice and they are 
homogeneous in terms of their travel requirements (valuation of time, arrival time etc).  
Finally we would also like to allow the product and labour markets to be uncovered. In the 
existing model, workers cannot choose not to work and shoppers have to buy one of the 
differentiated product variants. It would be interesting to introduce an outside option, as was 
considered for the simple one product market model but the generalisation is not 
straightforward. In particular, we currently require that each household consumes one unit of the 
differentiated good and supplies one unit of labour for its production. This leads to the market 
clearing condition that the proportion of workers and shoppers at any subcentre are equal. 
Clearly, allowing shoppers to choose an outside option, which could be produced in the city 
centre for example, or allowing workers to seek a different employment option would have 
consequences for the production and consumption of the differentiated good and for travel costs 
in general. 
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